Me constitute the second-largest religious community in India, thirteen per cent (130 million) of the total population. Spread over the subcontinent, the Muslim community 1s, contrary to popular belief, internally highly heterogeneous. Apart from divisions based on sect, region, and economic class, Muslims in India are divided by caste-like structures, making it difficult to maintain a definition of Muslim identity based solely on religion. Empirical studies have brought to the fore two broad categories of Indian Muslims: Ashraf (noble or upper class) and Ajlaf (common or low class) (Ahmad 1966: 268-78). The Ashrafs usually include the descendants of immigrants and are known as Sayyids, Shaikhs, Mughals, and Pathans, while Ajlafs are mostly descendants of converts from Hindu lower castes: weavers, butchers, carpenters, oilmen, barbers, washermen, and leather-workers. Even though rigid caste distinctions are not found among Muslims, there does exist a caste hierarchy that supports inequality in the distribution of prestige, power, and status. The Islamic principle of equality, it is said, is observed only in the religious domain.
The political orientations of Muslims reflect these two broad divisions in more ways than one. The elite sections in the Hindi belt were in favour of Partition because they thought their privileged position in the bureaucracy would be lost in a united India, while the low-caste masses remained more or less neutral to the Partition (Engineer 2004: 3984). It was mainly the privileged class that migrated to Pakistan, while poor artisans and shopkeepers preferred to remain in India (Noorani 2003: 139-41). The difference between the attitudes of the masses and the upper strata is seen in their perception of such issues as Muslim personal law. A study conducted in 1998 shows that villagers see no reason why there should be a separate personal law, whereas Muslim leaders view the law based on Shariat as one of the bases of religious identity (Dyke 1999: 122). Voting-behaviour surveys have pointed out that relatively backward Muslims may support a party with a radical programme (Sanjaykumar 1996: 138-41). In the 1999 Lok Sabha elections in Uttar Pradesh (UP), the upper class generally favoured the Congress, while the majority of working-class Muslims, such as the weavers in eastern UP, went with Mulayam Singh Yadav's Samajwadi Party (Bhushan 1999: 29).
Backward-caste Muslims became aware of the gap between their viewpoint and that of upper-caste Muslims after 1990, when the Union government accepted the Mandal Commission’s recommendation to extend job reservations to backward castes. As a consequence, a backward-caste perspective that challenges the establishment has emerged within the Muslim community. My essay analyses this new perspective and the distinct identity of Muslim backward castes it has produced, with an emphasis on Maharashtra. The origins of backward Muslim consciousness can be traced to the colonial period. In the 1920s the Momins (a caste of handloom weavers) of Bihar, who form around twenty per cent of the Muslim population of Bihar, supported the Congress instead of the Muslim League (Brass 1975: 247-57). In that decade, Bihar Momins and those of eastern UP formed an all-India Momin conference. In the first decade after Independence, the Momins of Bihar floated the Bihar State | Backward Muslim Federation, but the Federation turned inactive in - later years (Khan 1997: 65-6). The Kaka Kalelkar Backward Classes Commission (1955) was the first to recognize the fact that there were backward castes among Muslims and that they were on a par with their Hindu counterparts (Mondal 2003: 4894). In the late 1950s Rammanohar Lohia, a Socialist leader from UP, made backward-caste politics a constituent part of his socialist model. Lohia claimed that backward castes, ex-Untouchables, tribals, women, and depressed Muslims and Christians constituted around eighty-five per cent of the country’s population, but their proportion in politics, the army, government jobs, and trade was less than ten per cent. The Socialist party, he held, should give at least sixty per cent of the posts in public life to these backward sections (Lohia 1964: 121-42). However, Lohia’s backward-caste politics did not attract the depressed Muslims.
The Backward Classes Commission headed by B.P. Mandal was an offshoot of Lohia’s project. Its report (1980) listed about eighty Muslim communities among the backward castes that became entitled for a twenty-seven per cent reservation in public jobs and educational institutions (Jenkins 2001: 32-50). The decision of the V.P. Singh government in 1990 to accept the recommendations of the Mandal Commission generated a new awareness among backward-caste Muslims, especially in the new middle class that was emerging within these castes. AS a reaction to the growing consciousness and activities among backward-caste Muslims, Muslim elites started a movement to demand reservations in government jobs for all Muslims. In 1994 they floated an association for promoting education and employment for Muslims (Alam 2003: 4881-5). The association claimed that the entire Muslim community formed a backward class, and demanded that reservations be extended to Muslims in educational institutions and public jobs in proportion to their numbers and level of backwardness. Syed Shahabuddin, the founder of the association, argued that the cake would have to be cut not just horizontally, by caste and class, but also vertically, by religion, for the sake of an even distribution of opportunities. The Islamic Council of India and the All India Milli Council also pleaded for reservations for all Muslims (Jenkins 2001: 32—50). In 1994 Kerala, with a 23.22 per cent Muslim population and a Muslim party (Muslim League) as a partner in the ruling coalition, became the first state to accept this demand. Since coming to power in 2004, Andhra Pradesh’s Congress government has fulfilled its electoral promise to provide a five per cent reservation for Muslims in educational institutions and public jobs.
Backward-caste Muslims are not swayed by these actions or arguments of the Muslim establishment. They see them as another attempt of the privileged sections to seek benefits in the name of the community, and point out that general reservations made on a religious basis will basically benefit the Ashrafs and will not reach the lower- class or lower-caste Muslims (Engineer 2004: 3984-5). A recent survey reveals that upper-caste, upper-class Muslims almost completely control the institutions and organizations of the community. Out of between ten and forty executive members and directors of the All India Personal Law Board, the All India Milli Council, and the Imarat—i-Sharia (Bihar and Orissa), only a couple come from backward classes or castes, while their proportion of the total Muslim population is about ninety per cent. The same is true in the case of waqf boards, mosques, darghas, minority educational institutions, minority commissions, Urdu academies, Hajj committees, and the Maulana Azad Foundation at the regional and national levels. The disproportionate representation of high-caste Muslims is also found in the class-one services of the government bureaucracy (Alam 2003: 4882). A Bihar state study shows that hardly any backward-caste Muslims are found among the Muslim members of the legislature or parliament (Engineer 2004: 3984-5). This is why backward-caste Muslims insist upon caste-based reservations, whereby deprived sections will get the benefits that flow from reservation.
Backward-caste Muslims insist that the Muslim community in India is not a homogeneous entity. The community is divided both horizontally and vertically, with caste-like divisions being the most decisive. There is a contradiction between the interests of the Ashraf castes and those of the Ajlaf castes. The backward-caste perspective demolishes the myth of a single collective Muslim mind and takes a different view of the world than that of upper-caste Muslims. The Muslim leadership, which basically comes from the upper castes, takes up cultural and sensitive issues in order to mobilize the people. They harp upon memories of Muslim power and the lost glories of the past (Alam 2003: 4881-5). The traditional leaders concentrate on symbolic and emotional demands such as maintaining the minority character of Aligarh Muslim University, continuing a separate personal law for Muslims, the status of the Urdu language, and the controversy over the Babri Mosque at Ayodhya (which Hindu nationalists claim 1s the birthplace of the god Ram). Muslim religious leaders have also been criticized by backward-caste Muslims for being concerned about empty ritualism, acting within the limits of their own little world, living off donations given by ordinary Muslims, and doing nothing for the welfare of the poor. Those who control such organizations as Jamaat-i-Islami or Tablighi-Jamaat, as well as Sufi shrines, are accused of having betrayed the true teachings and spirit of Islam (Sikand 2004: 94—102).
The new leadership emerging from among backward-caste Muslims views Islam asa radical project of social liberation. The Hindu downtrodden castes embraced Islam in order to seek equal status, which was denied to them by Hinduism. But this emancipatory aspect of Islam was later forgotten and these converts were placed in a position analogous to their pre-conversion status. The new leadership perceives itself as a‘revolutionary one concerned with regaining the egalitarian aspect of Islam. It aims to free Islam from the clutches of high-caste Muslim leaders and to revive the true spirit of Islam, which condemns all divisions and hierarchies. These backward-caste leaders stress education, jobs, and material well-being rather than symbolic or emotive issues. They look to the Hindu backward castes as their allies in the struggle for equality and justice.
By transcending differences among lower and Untouchable castes, the new leadership is assuming a Dalit identity. These leaders call themselves ‘Dalit Muslims’, a term that includes descendants of ‘Untouchable’ converts and lower-caste converts. Ejaz Ali, in fact, demands that Scheduled-Caste status should be extended to Dalit Muslims and calls for a non-violent Jihad to be fought by Dalit Muslims in alliance with non-Muslim Dalits and the secular forces in the country. Many of these “Dalit Muslims’ regularly write in Dalit Voice, a periodical devoted to the question of the human rights of persecuted nationalities in India. Rashid Salim Adil, a social activist and lawyer based in Delhi, goes beyond advocating mere unity between Dalit Muslims and non-Muslim Dalits; he pleads for non-Muslim Dalits to convert to Islam, which he holds to be superior. Adil holds that conversion to Islam will be a means of empowerment and liberation of the oppressed (ibid.: 110—28).
In order to promote their alternative perspective, the new leadership has developed organizations of Other-Backward-Classes (OBC) Muslims.! In 1993, Maharashtra became the first state to have a Muslim OBC organization. The next was Bihar, where Ejaz Ali established the All India Backward Muslim Morcha (AIBMM) in 1994. Another new organization in Bihar is the Pasmand Muslim Mahaz (PMM), formed by Ali Anwar. Recently a similar organization, the Uttar Bango Anagrasar Muslim Sangram Samiti, has been started in the northern districts of West Bengal (Mondal 2003: 4895). In the next section I review the activities and ideology of the organization in Maharashtra.
MAHARASHTRA
It is in the literary movement of Muslims that we find the origins of the backward-caste perspective in Maharashtra. For Muslims in Maharashtra the medium of creative writing has always been Marathi, the regional language, rather than Urdu. The short stories and novels they produced gave them a Marathi identity that was a departure from the standard pan-Indian Muslim identity. In 1989 some of these writers came together to form a distinct literary association. It is an established ‘practice among marginalized sections in Maharashtra to use a literary movement as a platform to express protest against unjust social structures and to put forward an alternative framework. The Dalit literary movement is typical in this regard. The most significant activity of such movements is to organize annual conferences, at which the issues debated go beyond mere literature and literary criticism. Therefore, when Muslim Marathi creative writers started organizing annual conferences, the topics that came up for deliberation and discussion included their experience of inequality and the injustice produced by the caste distinctions within the community. The medium of communication for most backward-caste Muslims living in villages and towns is basically Marathi, and they are usually educated in Marathi- medium schools. Creative writers from this social background were bound to express their anger about unjust social relations from a Marathi literary platform created specifically for Muslims.
The idea of a Muslim OBC organization as a means to agitate for social justice and to seek legitimate space for downtrodden Muslims was raised at the second Muslim Marathi literature conference, held at Nagpur in 1992. At the next conference, at Ratnagiri in 1993, a detailed plan for the Muslim backward-castes organization was finalized. The leaders of the Maharashtra OBC organization made important suggestions to the activists leading this endeavour (interview with Vilas Sonawane, 1 April 2006). The All India Muslim OBC organization (AIMOBCO) was thus established in 1993 by the founder members of the Muslim Marathi literary association. At the first convention of the Muslim OBCGs, held at Jalna in the Marathwada region in May 1994, Shabbir Ansari, who belongs to'a weaver caste, was appointed the organization’s president. During the next five months, the AAMOBCO organized a number of district and regional level conventions and conferences. The year ended with a huge rally at Solapur in September, attended by delegates from different parts of Maharashtra.
The massive attendance at the rally indicated the unrest among backward-caste Muslims. It was a public expression of grievance and pain (Lokmat, 8 September 1994: 2). Sensing this, and taking into account the fact that elections were due soon, the then Congress government decided to apply the Mandal Commission’s reservation provisions to Muslim OBCs in Maharashtra. The second convention of the AAMOBCO was held at Aurangabad on the eve of the 1995 assembly elections. Chief Minister Sharad Pawar was expected to address the convention. Although he did not turn up, he was honoured and profusely thanked ‘n absentia for extending reservations to backward-caste Muslims. The convention demanded the inclusion of all Muslim backward castes -n the reservation list, extending reservations to different sectors, education and financial facilities, a housing and development corporation for Muslim OBCs, and so forth. The convention urged the government to direct local revenue officers to give caste certificates to Muslim OBCs and not to re-examine a certificate once it had been given (Maharashtra Times, 16 January 1995).
The year 1995 saw the Bharatiya Janata Party—Shiv Sena alliance come to power in the state. This alliance of Hindu militant parties pointed out that the government resolution (GR) regarding reservations for Muslim OBCs had never been issued. The government soon revived the GR, probably believing that the reservations for backward Muslims might divide the community (interview with Sonawane, 31 March 2006). If the September 1994 Solapur rally was a great success, the natjonal convention held at Delhi on 29 August 1996 was a spectacular show. It was attended by important leaders of various secular parties and by activists as well as journalists. Delegates from various backward- caste groups from ail states except Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and the north- eastern states participated. The convention demanded extending the Mandal provisions to all Muslim OBGs, scholarships, land reforms, funding for small entrepreneurs from backward communities, and restoration of concessions to Scheduled-Caste Muslims that had been withdrawn in 1984 (The Times of India, 12 September 1996). The next convention, held at Lucknow in 1997, was attended by Dilip Kumar, a very popular Muslim actor from the Hindi film industry. The success of the Delhi and Lucknow conferences produced disquiet and nervousness among the Ashraf leaders of the north, prompting them to organize two seminars of the Ashrafs at Aligarh Muslim University ene oni oa ap atorm to build their defences (interview with Sonawane, After a steady growth for almost four consecutive years, in 1998 the Muslim OBC movement in Maharashtra started showing signs of discord. The two founding fathers and ideologues of the movement Fakruddin Bennur and Vilas Sonawane, began to distance themselves from Shabbir Ansari, the president of the organization, and also from the organization’s activities. They were not happy with the way Shabbir Ansari was running the organization, especially with Ansari’s move to take the organization closer to party politics. At the time of the 1999 elections the distancing of Bennur, Sonawane, and their friends in the organization from Shabbir Ansari culminated in nearly splitting the organization. Shabbir Ansari approached Sharad Pawar (who had left ” the Congress and had formed the Nationalist Congress Party) for tickets. But Pawar refused to oblige him, because by that time Vilas Sonawane had succeeded in getting Dilip Kumar to promise to support to the Congress and to address public meetings during the campai n Ansari, therefore, appealed to the Congress and secured five tickets, - on which four Muslims and one non-Muslim contested the elections to the assembly (interview with Sonawane, 6 April 2006). Of the four Muslim candidates—Datture Hafij Hussain in Miraj, Sayyaid Ahmed in Nagpada, Abdul Rashid Mohhamad Tahir Momin in Bhivandi, and Shamim Ahmad Khan in Parbhani—the first three registered victories The split was formalized after the elections of 1999. Since then two Muslim OBC organizations have functioned simultaneously in Maharashtra—one led by Shabbir Ansari (based in Jalna) and another led by Iqbal Ansari (based in Pune). The Pune organization strong] believes that a Muslim OBC organization should not indulge in anty or electoral politics, even though caste groups associated with the qrganization may take their own positions and support the parties of their choice (interview with Iqbal Ansari, 21 March 2006). While refusin to go Shabbir Ansari’s way, the Pune organization led by Iqbal Ansar: engages in activism with respect to reservations for Muslim OBCs interview with Iqbal Ansari, 21 March 2006). It routinely looks after cat g Ss concerning Muslim OBCs, facilitating the process of curing caste certificates from revenue officers, approaching the Maulana Azad Minority Development Corporation (instituted in 2002 by the state government) to obtain financial help for members of occupation-based castes, and carrying out related activities for the betterment of the backward sections of Muslims in the state.
REGIONAL IDENTITY
The course the Muslim OBC movement in Maharashtra has taken, the way it has advanced from its inception, the issues the movement has raised, and the ideological positions its leaders have taken from time to time have been decided by the history, social structure, and politics of Maharashtra. Consequently, the Maharashtra movement has acquired a regional character while maintaining its all-India connection. Bennur (2003: 1-4) observes that even though the term ‘caste’ 1S not used with reference to Muslims, the nature of the Jamat or biradari is almost the same as caste, as It possesses all the traits of the caste system— endogamy, dress-code, separate mosques, occupation-based groups, hierarchy, stratification, and so on. The Muslim masses are 4 mirror image of the Hindu masses. Practically all types of castes are found among Muslims——occupational castes, service castes, backward castes, criminal castes, and also tribal and nomadic communities. The Muslim caste system differs, again like that of the Hindus, from region to region. Castes that are considered unclean or almost untouchable in one region are treated as only backward in another. Dhobis (washermen) or Darjees (tailors) are treated as Untouchables in the north, while in © Maharashtra they are categorized as OBCs. The Ashraf class in the north is characterized by memcries of the Mughal empire, a sense of - social superiority, and a feudal outlook (nababiyat). This class considers people engaged in manual work as inferior (kanyat).In Maharashtra, where factors like Muslim rule, zamindari, and feudalism were rather weak, downtrodden Muslim castes are not treated like Untouchables, although Mehetars (scavengers) or Quereshis (butchers) who do unclean jobs are ostracized.
The majority of Indian Muslims are converts frorn Hindu lower and occupational castes. Their conversion, Bennur points out (2003: 2-9), was a result of the Sufis’ preaching of Islamic principles of equality and brotherhood, and was not motivated by either money or power. Islam gave them a respectable identity. They rejected the principle of purity and pollution and the concept of human inequality, but they could not renounce those features of the caste system that were entrenched ir the psyche and social life of the people. The categories. of Ashraf and Ajlaf are a result of this phenomenon. The conversion process could change the caste system but could not annihilate it. This is why caste distinctions operate not only among Muslims but also among Sikhs, Jains, and Christians. Bennur agrees with Klass’s theory (1980) that caste is a special feature of the South Asian social system. The Mandat report, according to Bennur, has taken cognizance of this.
Bennur does not agree with the sociologists who view Muslims in India as having a kinship system rather than a caste system. He argues that such sociologists’ perception is influenced by their social location and political ideology, and that they therefore refuse to look at the social reality. Bennur condemns historians for interpreting medieval Indian history as a history of conflict hetween Islam and Hinduism and tor branding all Muslims as foreigners. He disapproves of the attempt to present religious community as nation or nationality. The colonial power, he says, contributed to this understanding of Indian history and nationalism by systematically following a divide-and-rule strategy. As a consequence, instead of caste, religion came to be seen as the foundation of social structure and began to occupy a central place in socio-political discourse, and Hindus and Muslims began to be conceived of as monolithic groups. According to Bennur, Muslim rulers, their ulema, and feudal lords used and distorted Islam to suit their interests and to continue their domination over the converted Muslim masses. They rejected the existence of a caste structure in the name of religion.
Bennur finds backward-caste Muslims in Maharashtra to be economically, educationally, and socially marginalized, suffering from poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, and homelessness. Middle-class Muslims and their Ashraf leaders do not interact with them. OBC Muslims who live in villages lead a pitiable life, and some, such as Hajams (barbers) and Mehetars (scavengers), experience a sort of covert untouchability (Bennur 1999a: 2). ' The movement in Maharashtra, therefore, aims at organizing Muslim OBCs to strive for education (from primary to higher level), modernization, and protection of traditional skilled occupations; providing housing, hostels, and scholarships for boys and girls; availing the benefits of reservations in jobs and educational institutions according to the provisions of the Mandal Commission; appealing to the government to establish a development corporation for Muslim OBCs; encouraging Muslim educational organizations to start Marathi-medium schools; and persuading the government to include all Muslim OBCs in the Mandal list. The movement also tries to persuade Muslims to break down caste walls and seeks to make them aware of inter-caste marriage as a need of the hour. The main objective of the movement is to put an end to the caste system by integrating all Muslim OBCs. Upper-caste Muslims are able to maintain their hold over the OBCs because the OBCs lack unity. The movements’ leaders consider their struggle part of a larger struggle of all oppressed groups. For example, in the Solapur rally of September 1994 they invited Christian backward castes to join them.
Muslim OBCs in Maharashtra are inspired by the anti-caste radicalism of Mahatma Phule and Babasaheb Ambedkar. Phule, who belonged to a backward caste, started the Satyashodhak Samaj (Truth- seeking Society) for the emancipation of the backward and Dalit castes from the slavery instituted by the upper castes. Ambedkar, a Dalit leader, embraced Buddhism to liberate the Dalit castes from the clutches of high-caste Hindus. Sonawane highlights Phule’s contribution to the ideological framework of the Muslim OBC movement, mentioning especially Phule’s insights about caste-based slavery in Gulamgiri (‘Slavery’) and economic exploitation in Shetakaryacha Aasood ( The Farmer’s Whip’) (interview with Sonawane, 6 April 2006). Besides seeing their movement as a continuation of the struggle started by Phule in the nineteenth century, Muslim OBCs also draw inspiration from the egalitarianism of Islam. Bennur believes that Islam should be seen as a liberating force, propounded by the Prophet as an emancipatory ideology. Islam was originally meant to eradicate the hierarchical structures and distinctions in Arabian society. This radical and emancipatory content of Islam has been revived by leaders of the Muslim OBC movement in Maharashtra as it has been by Muslim OBC movements elsewhere in the country.
The movement is on principle opposed to religion-based reservations in government jobs and educational institutions. Religion- based reservations, it believes, are nothing but a continuation of the appeasement policy of the Congress party. Such a reservation policy does not benefit the backward or weaker sections in any way, for religion is not the cause of their backwardness. This policy will divide the marginalized sections, encourage communalism among them, and allow the BJP to use the resultant rift to capture power. Reservations based on religion, moreover, violate the secularism principle of the Indian Constitution. Bennur (2004b: 1—4) argues that the Congress party is violating the core principle of the Constitution for the sake of electoral politics. For instance, the Congress government’s policy of giving a five per cent reservation to all Muslims in Andhra Pradesh (AP) in 2004 will benefit only the upper strata, while the marginal sections will remain deprived. The majority of Muslims in AP are socially and educationally backward, and many are very poor, but this does not mean that they should be given religion-based reservations. Reservations must be based on caste.
Sonawane and Bennur are very critical of the Dalit Muslim category used by north-Indian Muslim backward-caste leaders, such as Ejaz Ali of the AIBMM (interview with Sonawane, 6 April 2006; Bennur 2003: 9-11). Bennur argues that the Dalits converted to Islam to free themselves from slavery and an inhuman existence, so why should they be given the same Dalit identity in the name of radicalization, and why should their self-respect be shaken again? He points out that many Muslim castes are experiencing upward mobility. They are changing their occupations. Some are switching over to new means of livelihood and even discarding the practice of endogamy. Bennur found that many from the Muslim masses in Maharashtra were critical of the OBC movement because they wanted to get rid of caste labels. If this is their view about the term ‘OBC’, what would be their reaction to taking on Dalit identity? Converted Muslims have tried to renounce many features of Dalitness. The mere fact that there is a division between the dominant class of Ashrafs on the one hand and that of backward, illiterate, poor Muslims on the other does not call for a label of ‘Dalit Muslims’ for the latter. Bennur thinks that the category Dalit Muslim will not be helpful for Muslim backward castes in their efforts toward empowerment.
OBC Muslims in Maharashtra strongly believe that there is no one identity for all Muslims. This does not mean thai they are against religious identity as such. What the leaders of the Muslim OBCs stress is that religious identity is only one form of identity. They hold that they belong to the backward castes among Muslims, and that they want to mobilize the backward castes against the domination of upper-caste Muslims. The OBC identity is the one that they project when challenging upper-caste Muslims and when uniting with non-Muslim OBCs. These leaders reject a pan-Indian identity because they hold that they are Marathi Muslims belonging to Maharashtra, a region with its own distinct character. Their movement was born out of the Muslim Marathi literary movement. An OBC Muslim living in a rural or semi-urban area realizes that Urdu is not his language. It is the language of Ashraf Muslims, the language of urban, metropolitan Muslims. For all practical purposes, Marathi is the language of communication for the majority of Muslims in Maharashtra. As in the case of Bangladesh, language ~ sometimes acquires greater prominence than religious identity (Sayyad -.2001: 7-12). Sonawane points out that, to begin with, Urdu is an Indian language and has no direct relation to Islam. Lower-caste Muslims in Marathwada, in some districts of Vidarbha, and in villages on the Maharashtra-Karnataka border speak Dakhani, not Urdu. ‘Thus, Dakhani and Marathi play a more important role in the identity formation of backward-caste Muslims of Maharashtra than does Urdu (interview with Sonawane, 6 April 2006). As in the case of the OBC mobilization, Muslims in Maharashtra also took the lead in organizing a social reform movement with an emphasis on unjust personal law. In 1972, Hamid Dalwai, a reputed Marathi author and a Socialist, established the Muslim Satyashodhak Mandal (MSM, ‘Muslim Truth-Seeking Organization’) to undertake social reform activity from a secular-rationalist standpoint. The OBC movement appreciates the contribution of the MSM in bringing to the surface the unjust treatment of women in Muslim personal law (Shariat) and in exposing the orthodoxy of the ulema. But the OBC movement argues that it is not Islam but the Shariat practices thrust on'women by the ulema that are responsible for the injustice. The movement feels that MSM did not take into account the social reality of Indian Muslims. It never tried to understand the mental make-up of Muslims, and always believed that there is only one Muslim identity. The MSM did not realize that Muslim society in India is divided into multiple castes. By concentrating on social reforms with reference to women, the MSM neglected the question of the material well-being of the majority of Muslims. Because the Muslim OBC movement views Islam as a radical and emancipatory force, it does not agree with Dalwai's sceptical . position. Although Dalwai was a Muslim, his perception of Islam basically remained Brahmanical, and he took positions that were more suitable to Hindu elites (Sayyad 2001: 28-30). The AIMOBCO’s outlook on the application of personal law to cases of divorce is one of compromise and conciliation, not confrontation (interview with Iqbal Ansari, 2] March 2006).
As noted above, the AAMOBCO (Pune) has kept itself aloof from. electoral or party politics, a factor that was one of the most important reasons for the split in the organization. Bennur takes the view that electoral and party politics will bring casteism, unfair competition, and selfish bargaining to the movement. In his view, the AAMOBCO as an organization should not take any position during elections, but the members of the organization and various communities may take part in elections on their own. In Maharashtra members of Muslim backward castes choose various parties according to their preferences and affiliations. Securing election tickets or getting power positions for a few does not lead to the development of marginalized communities. On the contrary, this type of power politics results in certain castes or communities having a monopoly. The movement gets into the hands ‘of a few political manipulators and finally dissolves into power politics via electioneering; this is what happened in the case of the Dalit movement in Maharashtra (Bennur 1999b: 2)
CONCLUSION
The Muslim OBC movement is now twelve years old. The movement is a child of the Mandal Commission. Such a movement is not conceivable without the Mandal Commission report, which listed backward Muslim communities as OBCs eligible for reservations. The movement was born after 1990, when the V.P. Singh government at the centre accepted the recommendations of the Commission. The Mandal Commission constructed OBC identity for backward Muslims—the official category framed by the state generated a self-consciousness among backward-caste Muslims that finally resulted in their movement for social justice and equality. Earlier, Rammanohar Lohia's backward- caste politics had projected an alliance of backward castes and depressed Muslims in the 1950s, but there were no takers for his project among the depressed Muslims. When the Mandal Commission report was submitted in 1980, it did not produce awareness among backward- caste Muslims. Their movement was born only after 1990, probably because by that time a sizeable middle-class leadership had taken shape within the backward Muslim communities, and the goal seemed attainable. The demolition of the Babri mosque at Ayodhya in 1992 exposed both communal and liberal Muslim leaders, and created a vacuum in ideology as well as in leadership. Muslims were now receptive to fresh ideas and ready to listen to new leaders (interview with Sonawane, 6 April 2006). This political atmosphere probably aided the movement of Muslim OBCs, which was taking a backward-caste approach. Thus, the failure of communalist politics provided the background for the rise of the OBC movement in the early 1990s.
The movement has passed through two stages. From its inception to the late 1990s is the stage in which the movement aimed to pressure the government to frame a reservation policy in accordance with the provisions of the Mandal Commission. The movement succeeded in this regard, since the government implemented the recommendation of the Mandal Commission and included Muslim communities. in the OBC list. In Maharashtra, although the government accepted the AIMOBCO’s demand to form a development corporation for Muslim OBCs in 1995, the Maulana Azad Minorities Development Corporation was constituted only in 2002. It covers all Muslims and not only Muslim OBCs. The second stage began after the main demands regarding framing of the policy were accepted. In this stage, the movement is engaged ir the routine activity of monitoring the implementation of the provisions about reservations. In this respect, the Muslim OBC organizations in different states function basically like non-government agencies, playing the role of middleman between citizens and the bureaucracy.
The movement is not spread evenly in all states. In Bihar, for example, where the movement is in comparatively good shape, there are two organizations, one led by Ejaz Ali (AIBMM) and another led by Ali Anwar (PMM). Muslims of the northern districts of West Bengal have a small organization. In Maharashtra the movement is split into two organizations, while in Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh it is in a nascent stage. UP, with a Muslim population of around seventeen per cent, has not been able to develop a Muslim OBC movement, possibly because of the disorientation generated by the Samajwadi Party and the BSP, as both of them have a good base among Muslims. Thus, generally speaking, the Muslim OBC movement is gradually declining. It could be argued that the movement has reached a stage from which it can either decide to exist in the form of a non-government organization sorting out the problems of Muslim OBCs case by case, or plunge into politics by developing a political party. In the current era of coalitional politics, even the smaller parties are likely to gain a share in power. Muslim OBCs could enter into this competition, which has become more open in recent years. This would mean taking a risk in order to attain a share in power that they could use to liberate themselves from domination by the upper-caste Muslims and to establish the principles of social justice and equality enshrined in the teachings of Islam and the writings of Phule and Ambedkar.
Thus, the Muslim OBC movement has played a historic role. It is a politics that is rooted in the soil. It is true-to-the-ground reality, not something imposed from above by leaders unrelated to the masses. The movement has given rise to a new leadership that comes from the downtrodden sections that have experienced deprivation of the worst kind. The movement brings Muslims out of their so-called ‘ghetto mentality’ and brings them closer to backward communities belonging to other religions. It establishes solidarity across religious boundaries (Bidwai 1996: 2). By opposing religion-based reservations and by constructing an identity based on backwardness, the movement has successfully challenged fundamentalist designs on the one hand and Hindu extremism on the other. I have argued elsewhere that the best way for Muslims to get out of the minority trap is to join the caste- majoritarianism project, and that by doing so they will also be able to counter the Hindu majoritarianism of the BJP (Vora 2006). The caste- -based mobilization of the Muslim OBC movement punctures the ‘ minoritism of the Muslim community and establishes links between the struggles of the Muslim and non-Muslim marginalized sections whereby a majoritarianism of the oppressed can forcefully emerge.
NOTES
1. The term Other Backward Classes (OBC) is used by the Indian ‘Constitution for those backward groups which are not included in the Scheduled Castes. The Mandal Commission identified these OBCs in its report. The term ‘classes’ here is interchangeable with ‘castes’ for all practical purposes.
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