The roots of the defeat of the Congress in the 1995 assembly elections in Maharashtra go back to the communal riots which took place in January 1993 and the bomb blasts that followed in March. These two events added to the political reach of the BJP and Shiv Sena as well as alienated the Muslims from the Congress. Additionally, the campaign of the BJP-Shiv Sena alliance successfully exploited the notoriety of the corrupt Pawar government.
POLITICS in Maharashtra is known as a typical example of the ‘Congress system’ because the ‘political process in the state from its formation in 1960 never went beyond the parameters of this system. Similarly, it is also cited as the best instance of the ‘dominant caste’ thesis as the marathas, who constitute approximately 31 per cent of the population, had monopolised power positions due to their control over agricultural wealth, panchayat raj and .co-operatives. This description of Maharashtra held good until the 1995 assembly elections. In these elections, however, dominance of both the Congress and the marathas has been seriously challenged. The state has witnessed an unprecedented and in many ways unbelievable defeat of the Congress(I) resulting in the first ever real non-Congress government and one not dominated by the marathas coming from rural areas.
Last Elections
In order to understand this crumbling of the Congress empire, we will have to go back to the 1990 elections. in these elections, the party could secure only 141 seats out of 288 and 38.3 per cent votes. It came to power by readmitting into its fold the 13 rebels, The Shiv Sena and Bhartiya Janata Party, who had formed an alliance on the eve of elections, challenged the Congress dominance by capturing as many as 94 seats and 26.64 per cent votes. Except in 1978 when the Janata Party had won 99 seats and polled 27.99 per cent votes, the opposition had never reached such a high figure. In 1990, Sharad Pawar was at the helm of affairs in the Congress Party. While joining the central cabinet he saw to it that the chief minister, Sudhakar Naik, would. not try to undermine his position in state politics. But gradually Naik became independent and started dismantling the bases of Pawar citadel. Things became worse for Pawar when Naik exposed the connection between Pawar and. the underworld bosses like Hitendra Thakur and Pappu Kalani. The amorphous Congress organisation in the state lost whatever shape and direction it had due to the infighting between the factions led by Pawar and Naik. But the seeds of the Congress defeat in 1995 election were probably sown after the ‘communal riots in January 1993 in Bombay . which were followed by the bomb blasts in March 1993, These two events gave leverage to the Hindu alliance of the Shiv Sena and the BJP and, at the same. time, alienated the Muslims from the Congress.
In October of the same year, two districts of the Marathwada region experienced the worst ever earthquake in the region. Sharad Pawar, who took control of the relief and rehabilitation work, could not escape the charge of mismanagement. Around this time, a sex scandal involving local Congressmen was exposed at Jalgaon, a district town in the north Maharashtra, Then came. the traumatic-shock of the stampede at the time of the assembly session held in November 1994 at Nagpur. One hundred and thirteen protesting Gowari tribals died on the spot. Earlier in the year, a campaign of eradication of corruption was started with Pawar as the main target. The allegation of corruption made against him by the deputy municipal commissioner of Bombay, GR Khairnar, tamished the image of the chief minister. The inflation and the resulting price-rise precipitated the matters for the Pawar government .and gave the opposition an opportunity to turn it into an issue in the election campaign. Pawar tried to hold the ground by announcing a number of schemes aimed at ‘co-opting various sections of the society. He entered into an alliance with the Athawale faction of the Republican Party of India and changed the name of the Marathwada University to Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar Marathwada University. Chhagan Bhujbal, a mali-OBC leader of the Shiv Sena, and 14 of his followers were persuaded to join the Congress. Shivajirao Shendge, the leader from another important OBC caste, dhangar, was given prominence in the party, Bhujbal, Athawale and Shendge took the lead in . organising rallies of the OBCs at various places. Women were offered 30 per cent reservation in government jobs and a new policy for women was announced in order to give them a new status and also share in property. Unemployment allowance was increased by Rs 50. For farmers, a credit card scheme was introduced. Procurement price of cotton was enhanced. Ceiling on arid land was withdrawn in order to make it available for horticulture. The Mandal recommendations were accepted thereby increasing the reservation for the OBCs.
Muslims were promised that the TADA would be amended and that the backward castes among them would get the Mandal advantages. But the strong point of the Pawar government was obviously its industrial policy. Pawar implemented liberalisation proposals enthusiastically to see a steep rise in foreign collaborations, investment by multinationals and also in the total industrial production of the state. But none of these measures and policies could pay dividend to the Congress in the 1995 elections. The electoral campaign of the opposition, and. especially of the alliance of the BJP and Shiv Sena, revolved around the deeds of the Pawar - government rather on new promises. Balasaheb Thakare’s neo-fascist postures proved more effective than the half-hearted attempts of the Congress.
CONGRESS AND THE ALLIANCE
In the Vidhan Sabha elections of February ‘1995, the Congress Party could capture only 80 seats out of the fotal 288 securing 30.37 percent votes as against 14] seats and 38.17. per cent votes in the 1990 elections. Thus there was a clear loss of 69 seats with a 7.8 percentage points swing of votes against it. The alliance of the BJP and the Shiv Sena, . on the other hand, secured 138 seats and 29.28 per cent votes. In the last Vidhan Sabha elections, the alliance had got, as seen earlier, 94 seats and 26.64 percent votes. Thus there was a gain of 44 seats with a rise of only 2.64 per cent votes. The BJP had fielded 117 candidates and captured 65 seats securing 13.73 per cent of votes (42 seats and 10.71 per cent votes in 1990), while the Sena had fielded 171 candidates of which 73 won (52 in 1990). The Sena. . could secure 15.55 per cent votes this time, as against 15.93 per cent in 1990 though its seats increased from 52 to 73: These figures indicate that the difference between the voting percentage of the Congress and that of the alliance was only 1.09, while the difference in the seats they won was 58 which is quite high. The higher turn out of votes (9.54 per cent more than last time), it seems, helped the alliance more than the Congress, But the defeat of the Congress was much more serious than these figures tell. Many of the stalwarts and faction leaders, and ministers of the Pawar ministry, could not get re-elected. The past chief ministers and some aspirants to the post were denied even a membership of the assembly. District level leaders, with a stable support structure for years together, were defeated in these elections. Out of the72constituencies having sugar co-operative factories (within and out of the sugar belt), the Congress lost 26 seats. The performance of the party was better in the sugar belt districts of Poona, Satara, Sangali, Solapur, Ahmednagar and Nashik, if we take into account the success of the Congress rebels in this area. The region-wise distribution of the seats and votes would give us a clearer picture of the defeat of the Congress. In the western Maharashtra (total 75 seats), which is considered to be the backbone of the Congress party, the alliance increased its strength from. six to 15 seats (2.21 percent more votes than. in 1990), while 18 rebels won against the Congress candidates. The number of the Congress seats declined from 54 (48.83 percent votes) in 1990 to 37 (39.93 per cent votes) in 1995. Similar was the performance of the Congress in the north Maharashtra (total 36 seats). The party had to climb down from 21 seats (42.62 per. cent votes) in the last assembly to only 10 seats (29.69 per cent votes) in this region. On the other hand, the BJP-Sena combine enhanced its position from 10 seats (29.39 per cent votes) to 15 each (27.09 per cent) though its voting percentage went down little. The levels were successful in seven constituencies, mostly at the cost of the Congress. Marathwada, which was a stronghold of the Congress (total 46 seats), has shown an inclination towards the alliance since 1990. The alliance had secured 16 seats (28.72 per cent votes), then whereas in this election it got 24 (28.82 per cent votes). The Congress could manage to get only 12 seats (27.3 per cent votes) as against 23 (36.66 per cent. votes) last time. The rebels were able to acquire five seats. In Vidharbha also the alliance faired well capturing 33 out of 66 seats (22.48 per cent votes), increasing its strength by 10 seats. The Congress which had 25 seats in the earlier assembly (33.46 . per cent votes) could get only 17 (27.77 per cent votes). The rebels did well by winning in 11 constituencies. By giving a slogan of ‘Separate state for Vidharbha, the BJP could Capture 22 seats.
The Congress came out with its worst performance in the city of Bombay (total - Seats 34) and in the Konkan region. Though the voting percentage of the Congress in Bombay went down marginally from 34.8 - to 29.8, the party could secure only one seat as against nine last time. The alliance, however, got 30 seats (49.13 per cent votes), six more than in 1990. Konkan, having 31 Seats, sent 21 MLAs (39.5 per cent votes) of the alliance and only three (27.0 per cent votes) of the Congress. In 1990, the Congress had succeeded in getting nine seats here and the alliance 16.
This failure of the Congress calls for an ‘explanation’. The detailed analysis of the election results of all the 288 constituencies reveals that the most crucial factor in determining the fate of the Congress was the presence of rebel candidates, Contests against the official candidates by those who are denied tickets is not a new thing for the Congress. But in the February 1995 elections, the number of rebellious candidates reached the figure of 200. The party took disciplinary action against 166 rebel candidates. But this did not affect the chances of the rebels. Of the 45 independents who won, nearly 35 were the Congress rebels.
But that is not all. In 43 constituencies official candidates of the Congress were defeated and the alliance or other party candidates won because of high percentage of votes secured by the rebels who did not win. It means that the Congress could have Secured approximately 78 seats over and above the 80 which it actually won. Thus the root cause of the Congress defeat was to be found within the Congress organisation rather than outside, _ The Muslims, who constitute 9.3 per cent of the population of the state, have consistently voted for the Congress with an aberration in 1977. Their vote bank has a significant position in about 40 constituencies. Analysis of the voting pattern, in these constituencies shows that the Muslims had decided to teach a lesson to the Congress. However, that does not mean that they voted for the Hindu militant parties: most of them voted for the Muslim candidates of the Congress or of the non-Hindu parties. Wherever the Muslims candidates were not in the fray, they preferred the non-Congress and non-Hindu party candidates. A total of eight Muslims (seven in 1990) won this time, two each on Congress and Janata Dal, three on Samajwadi Party and one on Shiv
Sena tickets. But what is important is not how many Muslims won but in how many constituencies they were responsible for the defeat. of the Congress, A close observation of the Muslim-dominated constituencies makes it clear that in as many as 10 constituencies the Congress candidates had to face defeat because the Muslim vote went away from them in a predetermined fashion. The attitude of the Congress government in connection with the mosque demolition, riots, bomb blast and identity cards for the Muslims had created a severe anti-Congress feeling among them. The elections gave them an opportunity to express it.
If we add these 10 constituencies to the 78 where the Congress was defeated because of the rebels, the total number of constituencies where the Congress could have won inspite of the alliance reaches 88. This is an indication that the defeat of the Congress had something to do with the party itself.
The organisation of the party is in total disarray today. It has become a conglomeration of factions having no ideology or a leader to bind them together in a workable unity. The Maharashtra Congress has converted itself into a bundle of complacent feudal! maratha leaders with no’ will and capacity to see beyond their co-operatives, districts or clans. The Congress leadership coming from rural areas has not been able to grasp the transformation which is taking place in the economy of the state. Sharad Pawar, a true representative of this change, _ has not succeeded in communicating the message to his fellow party men. The rural economy is now linked to the international market. The days of small-scale agro- industries and co-operatives are over. The reign of market, competition, joint stock companies and multi nationals has come to stay. The leaders of the co-operatives are trying to oppose privatisation in vain. _ The rate of urbanisation is very high in the state. The proportion of the urban population is nearly 39 per cent whereas the Indian average is 26 per cent. The state has gained a leading position in the industrial sector Compared to that of the agriculture. Out of the total industrial output of the country, around 25 per cent comes from Maharashtra. The per capita value added due to the industries is Rs 870 in Maharahstra - while the Indian average is only Rs 308. With the new economic policy, about 1535 industrial projects, having an investment worth: Rs 1,96,708 crore, are in various’ stages of planning. Out of these, 152 (Rs 22,000 crore) involve participation by the NRIs. Maharashtra and Gujrat account for 63 per cent of the total NRI investment in India. In 1993-94, manufacturing sector _ contributed 25.6 per cent to the total state income while the agriculture sector’s contribution was 20 per cent. In 1950s, the share of the agriculture sector used to be around 33 per cent. The importance of the service sector, which is basically an urban sector, is proved by its contribution to the state income which is 20 per cent of the total. These figures indicate that the urban sector is acquiring greater significance in the state and, therefore, the rural-based Congress. is becoming irrelevant. There are in all 9] urban and semi-urban constituencies of which the Congress was able to capture only 11 while the BJP-Sena alliance won63. It shows that almost 70 per cent of the urban‘ constituencies are in the control! of the alliance. Bombay, the business capital of India, has preferred the alliance to the Congress. The BJP, with a following among - upper Castes, while collar workers, trading communities and educated middle class, is in control of the cooperative banks, educational institutions, libraries and cultural associations in the urban areas. It has a good base among the Hindi, Sindhi and Gujrati speaking people. Twelve out of the 18 non- marathi MLAs of the new assembly won on the BJP ticket. The Shiv Sena. since its formation, has been a party of the city of ‘Bombay. It no more takes anti-non-marathi stand. Samana, a mouth-piece of the Sena, publishes its Hindi edition in view of the growing Hindi-speaking population of . Bombay. Its trade union. front, known as’ Kamgar Sena, has been friendly with the Bombay business since its inception, and, at the same time, has built a very good support among the factory workers by relegating to the background the left-oriented and other unions. The Samana and Navkal, a pro-Hindutva paper, have captured the imagination of the workers not only in Bombay but also in cities. like Poona. In this way, the partners of the Hindu alliance have come to acquire dependable base in the urban areas of the state co A look at the composition of the new government makes the point clear. In its. cabinet of 22 ministers, 11 are from the urban constituencies seven out of these are from the city of Bombay and are holding important portfolios like finance, revenue, industry, and urban development, etc. For the first lime alter the formation of the state in 1960. Maharashtra has. a brahmin chief minister and two brahmin cabinet ministers.
It must be noted that in Maharashtra brahmins are basically an urban community. Among the 16 state ministers six are from urban areas. Two of the three regional development corporations are headed by Sena’s urban followers and the state planning board chairman also comes from an urban area. On - the basis of the foregoing analysis, we can argue that the state of Maharashtra, so far ruled by the rural sector, has come to have, for the first time in its history, an-urban sector dominated government, The caste and community composition of the Joshi government shows that there are only four marathas in the cabinet as against. . 10 in last’ government. The number of the other backward caste ministers has doubled (6). In his campaign Sharad Pawar. had warned the peasant castes that the brahmins would come to power. This has actually happened giving a terrible shock to Pawar and his maratha followers.
New VIDHAN SABHA
The caste composition of the Vidhan Sabha remains almost the same as before. Maratha and kunbis maintained their strength of 114 and 24 respectively making the proportion of the maratha caste cluster 47.91 per cent (their proportion in population is 31.19 per cent). If we take out the reserved constituencies (40) from the total of 288, the proportion of maratha-kunbis becomes 55.64 per cent in 248 unreserved constituencies. It is interesting to note that the-Shiv Sena is emerging as an alternative political vehicle available to the marathas. The number of maratha candidates who won on the Shiv Sena ticket was 32 while it was 44 for the Congress and 21 for independents who were mainly Congress rebels. The Shiv Sena, which made inroads in the rural area by mobilising OBCs, is now representing, along with the Congress, the maratha interests.
The only difference between the maratha candidates of the Sena and those of the Congress is that the Sena candidates are very young and have no or little support structure in the form of co-operatives, etc. They are those disgruntled elements who are not absorbed in the local power structure by clannish marathas of the Congress. Shiv Sena represents those marathas who were not happy with the decision of the Congress to change the name of the Marathwada University. Bal Thackarey, by opposing this decision, successfully mobilised the marathas in the marathwada region. It was not Surprising that the Congress rebel who supported the Sena on the issue of renaming joined the new governments state minister. The Maratha Maha Sangh, a caste and communal organisation of the marathas, had entered into an alliance with the Sena in these elections. Due to these factors, we see a clear division in the maratha vote this time.
The caste group which attracted the attention of the radicals and the political commentators was that of the OBCs. Our analysis suggests that there was no OBC: consciousness at work in these elections. In fact, the actual number of OBC MLAs remained almost the same (around 50-53), and that of mali and dhangar, wo important peasant castes of the OBC group, declined in the new assembly (from 1 to four and from five to three respectively). However. the number of women in the Vidhan Sabha increased from six in 1990 to I this time.
The Congress party, which had tried to project itself as a pro-women party, had given tickets to only 20 women of which only two could. win. Half of the 16 alliance women candidates succeeded in getting into the Vidhan Sabha. ' The social composition of the Vidhan Sabha has thus not basically changed if we: take into account the caste and communal composition of the members. But the character of the government has certainly undergone transformation in more ways than one.
Let us now look at the performance of the other parties in these elections. Attempts to form a third force failed because of short-sightedness and mean-mindedness of the leaders of the smaller parties of the centre and left. Therefore, two fronts were formed, One was known as Progressive Democratic Front comprising Janata Dal, Peasants and Workers Party, Republican Party (Khobragade), Dalit Mukti Sena (Kawade), Samata Party and Dalit Panthers led by a maratha from western Maharashtra. Two partners, the Janata Dal and Peasants and Workers Party, secured I} and six’ seats respectively. Others. drew a blank. Another front was formed under the . leadership of Prakash Ambedkar, grandson of Babasaheh Ambedkar, comprising of Indian Communist Party, CPI (M), Kamgar Aghadi, Satyashodhak Communist Party, Red Flag Party, Bharatiya Republican Party, and Bahujan Maha Sangh. This front had chtered into an agreement with the Bahujan Samaj Party (Kanshiram) and the Samajwadi Party. Except CPI (M) which got three seats and SP which also got three seats, none of ‘the parties could secure even a single seat. The much talked-about Bahujan Maha Sangh, claiming support from the dalits, OBCs and minorities from its inception in 1993, attained the number two position in 10 constituencies capturing around 3 per cent of the votes in the state. The Athawale faction of the RPI, which had an alliance with the Congress. also could not win even a single seat. Thus the performance of the dalit formations and factions was miserable No dalit candidate could’ win except one trom a non-reserved constituency, Out of the 18 reserved constituencies for scheduled castes, the BJP and Sena could claim 1. All of these, except one, belong to non- mahar or non-Buddhist castes whose population is much less than the mahars and among whom there is no radical - political movement. The performance: of the alliance was commendable also in the 22 constituencies reserved ‘for scheduled tribes. The BJP-Sena captured eight of these while the Congress and the independents could claim seven and five respectively. The CPI (M) and the Swatantrya Bharat Party of Sharad Joshi won one constituency each. Joshi’s rightist party, which contested from almost 130 constituencies, secured only two seats (including one ST) with the support from his farmers’ organisation. The Nag Vidharbha Andolan Samiti, fighting for Vidharbha cause, and Maharashtra Vikas party, another insignificant formation, secured one seat each in the new assembly. Therefore it is the Congress which will have to single-handedly fight the battle for opposition. But what course of action will the new government take? On the crucial economic front, the alliance government will not make any major changes because both the partners are fundamentally in agreement with the Congress policy. On the social front, the government is likely to continue its anti-Muslim and Hindu militant stand, making superficial and cosmetic changes in it. Both the partners of the alliance, and especially the RSS-dominated BJP will be interested in intervention in cultural and ideological sector. Thenew government will take up some populist programmes in order to win the Lok Sabha elections to be held next year. The strong anti-democracy tendency and inclination for dictatorship among them. educated and moderately educated middle and lower middle classes of Maharashtra will be expressed and represented by the Sena pramukh, who has already become the real ‘centre of power in the state.
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