The Indian nationalist movement generated many controversial issues in Maharashtra. One of the issues around which controversies revolved was about the method to be employed by the movement. M.G. Ranade (1842-1901) and G.K. Gokhale (1866-1915) believed that change was to be achieved step-by- step by using constitutional means. They came to be known as moderate nationalists. For Lokmanya Tilak (1856-1920) the method was of secondary importance. It should be modified in accordance with the demands of the movement and the pattern of response from the colonial rule. He held that everything is fair in politics and believed in the principle of wickedness unto the wicked. Tilak’s nationalism became known as extremist since he advocated actions such as boycott, non-payment of land- revenue and passive resistance. The means acquired prominence once again during Gandhian era. Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948) replaced Tilak’s doctrine of wickedness unto the wicked by the doctrine of “truth even unto the wicked”.1 By discovering new path of Satyagraha—of non-violent resistance—he took discourse of method of politics beyond moderate-extremist debate. The controversy which gathered importance after Gandhi’s formulation of Satyagraha method was with respect to violence vs. non-violence. Terrorist nationalism of V.D. Savarkar (1883-1966) glorified violence and condemned Gandhian method of conquering hate by love or untruth by truth.
Post-colonial studies by basically directing their attention to Gandhi's critique of colonialism and Western civilization have generally speaking neglected the Satyagraha dimension of Gandhi’s project and have not dealt with success and failure of. his method. My paper seeks to understand the way Gandhi's method was applied in the anti-dam movement in Maharashtra and attempts to analyze the factors which led to its failure.
Satyagraha implies adherence to truth by non-violent means. It involves the pursuit of truth and in that pursuit you invite suffering on yourself and do not cause violence to anybody else. Satyagraha postulates the “conquest” of the “adversary” by suffering in one's own person. It seeks to effect change and operates within a conflict situation. A Satyagrahi (one who actively participates in Satyagraha actions) refuses to cooperate with those responsible for violation of truth. Mahatma Gandhi held that there is no way to find truth except the way of non-violence and believed that in the quest for truth it is not possible to inflict harm on others because in so behaving truth itself would lose its meaning. Gandhi's method of Satyagraha emerged as the most commonly used technique of political resistance in Maharashtra since the 1920s. Mulshi Satyagraha was the first major instance where Gandhian non-violent method was tested by Maharashtrians. It was a protest movement against the dam the Tata Company proposed to construct on the confluence of Mula and Nila rivers in the Mulshi Peta (tract) of Pune District for the hyclro-electric power generation. The electricity produced at this plant was to be supplied to textile mills and the railways in Mumbai city. However, it was estimated that nearly forty-eight villages would be submerged by the reservoir of the dam. The villagers organized by the leaders of the nationalist movement staged a protest against the scheme by employing non-violent method. This anti-dam struggle began in April 1921 and continued till December 1924. But despite the agitation of more than three years by the villagers and their supporters the Mulshi Satyagraha failed to achieve its aim. The Gandhian path could not take dam- affected people to their destination. The Mulshi Satyagraha was a struggle between the poor farmers of the Mulshi tract and the Tata Company supported by the colonial government. The Tatas represented the rising class of businessmen and factory owners which had become stronger and confident after the First World War and was ready to make compromise with the government in order to seek concessions and benefits for the growth of industries. The Industrial Commission appointed by the government in 1916 had recom- mended a policy of encouraging Indian industry. No woncter the Mulshi project meant for providing electric power to the textile mills and factories in Mumbai city came to be supported by the government. Mulshi farmers thus fought a battle against a very powertul alliance and therefore faced a defeat. However, there were several other factors which pushed them towards the defeat.
GANDHI'S AMBIGUOUS STAND
One of the important reasons for the failure of the Mulshi Satyagraha Movement can be attributed to the ambiguity in Mahatma Gandhi's approach towards the movement. Gandhi was directly or indirectly connected with the movement from beginning to end. The leaders of the movement had consulted Gandhi before starting the Satyagraha in April 1921.7 We do not have any record of the meeting. But Gandhi must have given advice in favor of starting the Satyagraha because this 1s what he said in his speech before the Maharashtra Provincial Conference held in Vasai on 7 May 19213
Your love has drawn me here. Iam sorry I cannot stay in your miclst for long. With the president's permission, I shall say in brief what [want to. Tt is about Mulshi Peta (tract) that I must speak first. It grieves me that Ihave not been able to go there myself and acquaint myself at first hand with the grievances of our brethren there. My knowledge of the cletails of the struggle is scanty. I rarely get a chance to read a newspaper. I naturally hesitate to speak or write on any matter about which T do not know much. All the same, I have given my views on it in Young India without getting into cletails. I convey my sympathy to those who are attencling this meeting as representatives of the Satyagrahis of Mulshi Peta. People fighting for their rights always have my sympathy. I understand that the people of Mulshi Peta are fighting to defend the ownership of their farms. I stand by them in their claim. I always support people who are reacly to defend their possession at the sacrifice of their lives, but I can never join hands with those who are ready to kill others, be it even for the cause of truth. These people can get my help only for deciding whether they are fighting for truth or untruth. When I was asked about the people of Mulshi Peta starting a Satyagraha, I had replied that, if the people had the necessary Strength, the experiment was certainly worth trying. They have proved that they possess that strength. Whatever they have been able to achieve is good, so far as it goes. But they can have complete peace only when they are permanently assured of their rights. If a man does not want to relinquish his rights over a plot of land, it is not in keeping with the traditions of our country to obtain possession of it by recourse to law. I was once engaged ina small case, the man owned an ordinary piece of land but he was after me like a mad man to save it for him. As a father does not wish to sell his child, so also a man is naturally unwilling to part with his land. This has been our nature from ancient times. | hope our Tata company will take no steps against the Satyagrahis of Mulshi Peta. It is welcome to acquire land even without payment with people’s goodwill, but [hope it will make no move to obtain it so long as even one owner is unwilling to part with his piece. It may be European civilisation to acquire land by recourse to a Land Acquisition Act, but I should have nothing to do with a civilisation which I believe to be Satanic. So long, therefore, as the people of Mulshi Peta carry on their fight on peaceful lines, the whole of India should back them... .4
Earlier Gandhi had publicly urged the Tatas to come forward for conciliatory talks through his letter published in the Young India on 27 April 1921:
My heart goes out to these poor people. I wish the great house of the Tatas, instead of standing on their legal rights, will reason with the people themselves, and do whatever they wish in consultation with them. I have some experience of Land Acquisition Act. I had nearly eighty cases to deal with. Here the reason for the acquisition was not industrial development but insanitation. I know that the people never got the exact equivalent. What is the value of all the boons that the Tata scheme claims to confer upon India, if it is to be at the unwilling expense of even oné poor man? I dare say the problems of disease and poverty can be easily solved, and the survivors will! live in luxury if the three crore half- Starved men and women, and lakhs of decrepit humanity were shot and their bodies utilised for manure, or their bones utilised for making knife handles. And yet no one but a lunatic will put up such a suggestion. Is the case any weaker when men and women are not to be shot, but com- pulsorily dispossessed of their valued lands about which sentiment, romance, and all that makes life worth living, have grown up? I suggest to the custodians of the great name that they would more truly advance India’s interest if they will defer to the wishes of their weak and helpless countrymen.
PRO-COMPENSATION POSITION
In this letter Gandhi had not discussed Satyagraha as such. A careful reading of the letter reveals that he was, on the contrary, indirectly advocating negotiations and also the idea of acce Pung compensation. In the very next month, another article on Muls ‘ appeared in the Young India. On the one hand it criticize modernization and Westernization and on the other expressed views in favor of indigenous culture and social structure. The limitations of the Mulshi Satyagraha were spelt out at the end of the article. It is necessary to study this article closely because it reveals Gandhi’s changing position. A gist of the arguments is given here: The Whole of Mulshi Peta was being acquired by the unethical use of the Land Acquisition Act. According to the Government the construction of dam was in the public interest as it would contribute towards industrialization. The Government showed no hesitation in using force for this purpose. Having said this, Gandhi went onto criticize the Western social system based on industrialization. He says that imperialism, capitalism and militarization are the hallmarks of modern culture. This Western culture would impose itself upon India. We would be forced te adopt an individualistic way of life in place of the traditiona collective style of social life. Modernization carries individualism to its extreme. This would erode the very foundation of the institution of the family, too. The Mulshi Scheme was an example of an attempt to impose modern culture and unsettle the foun- dations of Indian social life. This would result in the alienation of man. Land acquisition was being justified on the basis of the theory of enhancement of material welfare of society through in- dustrialization. Instead, we should have taken into consideration the highest criteria of the well-being of society. When it as a question of the moral and social welfare of the people living here since times immemorial, we should give greater importance to moral welfare and uphold the Indian way of life over and above material welfare. He was not against large industrial projects merely because they tended to destroy small and cottage industries. He believed that the material and industrial progress should not destroy our original social structure and our culture. Our social life should remain unchanged. Industrial progress of the capitalist kind should not erode the fundamental social values which are the foundation of our society. Imperialism, capitalism and militarization carry the seeds of the destruction of society.
A society based on these three principles is bound to colapse. After this discussion, the author turns again to the Mulshi Satyagraha. Here he says only one question remains to be answered. No matter how brave, noble and praiseworthy the Mulshi Satyagraha was, no matter how exemplary a non-violent and patriotic struggle it was, it could not further the cause of Swaray (home rule). And without Swaraj, India would not free herself from the clutches of imperialism, capitalism and militarization. No doubt the Mulshi Satyagraha was an example of the use of civil disobedience against the Government of Bom bay and the Tata Company. But the type of civil disobedience that Mahatma Gandhi and Congress advocated was directly related to Swaraj. Its purpose was to fight one or more of the Government's branches whereas the Mulshi Satyagraha was mainly against the misuse of one act, the Land Acquisition Act.® The article thus exposed up the limitations of the Mulshi movement (putting the Mulshi Satyagraha in a poor light however, untenably). Many examples can be given of the movements led by Gandhi, that had a limited purpose. There had been movements against a single specific oppressive policy, tax or act and Gandhi had given those movements an all-India dimension. The question arises why the Mulshi movement was made an exception to this?
On what basis was it decided that Champaran Satyagraha of indigo cultivators of north-west Bihar was directly linked to Swaraj while Mulshi Satyagraha was not?
DEMAND FOR ALTERNATIVE LAND
An article about making alternative land available had appeared inthe Young India of 31 August 1922. Around that time a leaflet had been published which said that the search for suitable lands in other places had been stopped because nobody hac asked for alternative land. Young /ndia, commenting on this, says that the Mawalas (residents of Mawal region of which Mulshi tract was a part) had earlier been told by the Government that suitable land could not be found in Pune District. Hence, they must either accept lands in Nasik District or work as laborers on the dam. The ecdlitor asked whether the special officer of the Government had succeeded in getting land which would resettle the whole village in its original form. The Government must openly declare its compensation plan so that the Mawalas would not appear to be obstinate and unyielding. The Government must also keep in mind that no economically poor agricultural community could migrate a hundred miles from its original place.’ It is evident from the above that the Young India avoided saying anything about the Satyagraha and that it was in favor of the resettlement of the Mawalas, in a place not far away from Mulshi.
In July 1923 Gandhi figured again in the picture of Mulshi Satyagraha. Shankarrao Deo, Annasaheb Dastane and others were sentenced to imprisonment in 1923, after being prosecuted for leading the Satyagraha. They had begun a fast as an act of protest against the unjust treatment they had received from the jail officials. Gandhi was also in Yerwada (Pune) jail at that time. On hearing of it he had intervened on their behalf and helped to end the fast.
Dastane had consulted Gandhi when the Mawalas had begun to accept compensation and to slowly withdraw from the agitation. Gandhi had then advised him to stop the Satyagraha movement for three reasons, namely, that the Mawalas had accepted com- pensation, that the construction of the dam was already half com- pleted and that the leader of the Satyagraha did not beheve in non- violence.” The movement was then stopped. However, considering Gandhi’s policy regarding Mulshi, it appears that had he been consulted at an earlier stage, he might even then have recommended its withdrawal.
THE EXPECTATION OF SACRIFICE
As early as 1922, M.R. Jaykar velonging to the group of moderate nationalists had sensed that Gandhi's support to the Satyagraha had decreased considerably. Tata, too, knew of it. As a result, representatives of the Tata Company were rigid in their approach when Jaykar met them to mediate a compromise. Shankarrao Deo, who became a staunch Gandhian in later years was one of the major leaders of the Mulshi movement. His observations on Gandhi's attitude towards the Mulshi struggle are worth noting He says in his autobiography that the leaders tried their best to obtain Gandhi’s support for the movement but Gandhi did not fulfil their expectations because in Gandhi’s opinion the Mawalas were not prepared if necessary to dig into their trenches and make the ultimate sacrifice of their lives for the land of their birth. Although the Mulshi Satyagraha is witness to the fact that Gandhi was correct in his reading of the Mawalas, Deo says that even in hindsight he could never comprehend why Gandhi expected the ultimate sacrifice from the Mawalas and why he was reluctant to give priority to the question of their resettlement. !° Thus we see that even a true Gandhian like Shankarrao Deo felt that Gandhi did not extend his wholehearted support to them in the Satyagraha. However, even if the Mawalas had decided to observe Satyagraha unto death, it would have been impossible to clo so because the police arrested them and put them in jail as soon as they entered the area. Therefore, Deo’s point about readiness to make the ultimate sacrifice does not appear to be valid. His other observation regarding resettlement is erroneous too. As we have just seen, the Young India had made a stron case for proper resettlement. Gandhi was in ‘support of the Satyagraha in May 1921 but later on he began to favor re- settlement. It is possible that Gandhi supported the Satyagraha on the premise that the Government would be pressurized to consider the issue of compensation and alternative land. Once the Government started giving compensation, continuing the Satyagraha became, in his view, a pointless exercise.
But the contention that Gandhi did not attach much importance to Mulshi is justified to a large extent. Gandhi never visited Mulshi. Perhaps his involvement in the movement against the Rowlatt Act, in the Khilafat movement or the non-cooperation movement, did not have leave him with any time and energy to pay attention to a “local” or “regional” movement of “limited scope” like the Mulshi Satyagraha. But why did it remain “local” or “regional” in nature in the first place? Had he visited Mulshi and taken up the issue himself it could have greatly stepped up its importance. It was in his hands to make ita nationwide issue. Had the All India Congress taken it up, the movement would have become a national struggle and the Mawalas would have felt encouraged. It would also have boosted their leaders’ confidence.
VERBAL SUPPORT
In this context, Jaykar’s comment that Gandhi gave only verbal support is important. Jaykar has said that except for writing a letter in the Young India (27 April 1921) he did not do anything for the Satyagraha. He did not convert it into an all India movement, while he urged all Indians to support the Khilafat movement started by the Ali brothers.'' He made the Khilafat movement a part of the Non-Cooperation movement of the Congress. But with Mulshi, Gandhi acted differently. Congress leaders at the national levei too maintained a significant silence. This did not leave Maharashtrians unaffected. They realized that no matter how steadfast their commitment or how big the sacrifices they made, they would have to be content with the status of the Cinderella of the Gandhian movement."
Just as he did not go to Mulshi to express support to the Satyagrahi volunteers and Mawalas he did not meet the Tatas on behalf of the Mawalas either (at least we find no record of it today). His acquaintance with the Tatas was, in fact, of long standing. Ratan Tata had at the request of Gopal Krishna Gokhale contributed Rs. 25,000 towards Gandhi’s struggle in South Africa.'3 Had Gandhi intervened personally, the Mawalas might have got better compensation or perhaps land for resettlement as near as possible to their original location so that they could have all lived together again. He could have taken the initiative to stop the Satyagraha after the Mawalas started accepting compensation awards. But he refrained from doing so. In short it can be said that Gandhi did not take this struggle at all seriously. As a result, the movement neither met with success nor was called off after it had obtained the limited success it was to achieve.
A PARSEE COMPANY
If this movement had been only against the Government of Bombay it is possible that Gandhi, taking into account its importance in the nationalist movement would have extended active support to it. He might also have shown interest in it if the Lata Company had been a foreign concern like the estates of Champaran. But the Company involved in Mulshi was owned by the Parsees and Gujaratis. Purshottamdas Thakurdas, a Gujarati capitalist, was one of the directors of the Tata Company and it was he who represented the Company in the Legislative Council. The class of businessmen and capitalists in Bornbay had consistently supported Gandhi's movement since 1919. Gandhi, himself a Gujarati, could not have politically atforded to distance himseif from the Gujarati speaking people. The support that Gandhi's non-cooperation and Swadeshi movements got from Bombay Province came mainly from the city of Bombay.'? The Parsees and Gujaratis dominated the city. Even the Congress party was controlled by the community. And Bombay was, ina sense, Gandhi’s constituency. In this Situation, it would have been suicidal for him to oppose a project that was profitable for the capitalist and business class of the city. This may be the reason why Gandhi did not give wholehearted support to the movement. Moreover the picture of the Maharashtra Congress had not become clear. The stand of the extremists—the Supporters of Tilak—with respect to Gandhi and his policies had not yet become very clear. In a way, 1t may be said that Gandhi profited much from the Mulshi movement. It gave hima chance to gauge the inclinations of the ieaders of Maharashtra and mainly of Pune after the death of Tilak. It. enabled him to distinguish clearly between his supporters and opponents. Kelkar was an opponent. Now, if the continuation of the Mulshi movement was going to make Kelkar’s leadership shaky why would Gandhi recommend calling off of the Satyagraha? Gandhi's point of view seems to have been to allow the Satyagraha to continue till the political picture revealed itself. If the Kelkar party was bringing about its own downfall he was not about to prevent it by advising them to stop the Satyagraha. The Satyagraha would also oblige the leaders of the Marathi speaking area of Central Provinces and of Karnataka to define their stand. In short, one can say that Gandhi had decided to wait and watch the progress of the Satyagraha movement. He was still sceptical about Maharashtra, and especially of Pune. Some proponents of terrorist nationalism like S.M. Paranjpe, Senapati Bapat ancl some of the extremists had joined the Gandhian Satyagraha movement. Gandhi testec them inthe Mulshi Satyagraha. Thus we see that on the one hand, Gandhi did not actively support the Satyagraha because he did not wish to hurt the Parsees and Gujaratis while on the other he wanted the Satyagraha to continue because it would reveal to him the political alignments in Maharashtra. | 7 Gandhi is thus seen to find himself not only in a political dilemma but in a dilemma of principles too. The Mulshi dam was to ruin the rural way of life so dear to him and to encourage industrialization which he opposed. The economic power in the hands of a single family would increase. The project would promote the advance of Western civilization destroying the indigenous way of community living. The very purposes for which he wanted Swaraj were to be defeated. The poor people for whose upliftment he had formulated the principles of Sarvodaya (welfare of all) would be forced to go to the cities and work as laborers. He had expressed this thought in the Young /ndia of 25 May 1922. In spite of it all he could not support the Satyagraha actively because that would have worked against his immediate political objectives. He may be said to have given priority to politics over principles. His main aim at that time was Co give an impetus to and maintain the momentum of the freedom move- ment. To that end, he felt constrained to compromise even his principles.
LUKEWARM SUPPORT
The Mulshi Satyagraha would have been successful even with this kind of equivocal support from Gandhi, had Maharashtra responded to it strongly. While the newspapers and periodicals were overflowing with discussions and editorials on the Satyagraha, the actual participation in the movement was gradually de creasing. According to an overview taken by Mulshi Satyagraha Sahayak Mandal (Satyagraha Support Organization) on 16 February 1923, 400 Satyagrahis had been to jail, out of which 96 were Mawalas and 304 were volunteers from all over Maharashtra. The total donations collected amounted to Rs. 50,000.'5 This figure was poor when compared to expectations expressed at the Mulshi Conference. It had been resolved at the Conference to collect a fund of Rs. 3 lakh, enlist three thousand volunteers who were prepared to go to jail and to continue the Satyagraha for a period of three years. Publicity to the effect had also been carned out throughout Maharashtra. Senapati (General—Bapat became known as Senapati (General) during this movement) Bapat and other leaders had toured the length and breadth of the province, to collect funds and volunteers and had used effective means like Melas (a form of folk theater), songs, procession, speeches, etc. to enthuse the people. Leaders like V.M. Bhuskute were in continuous contact with each and every village of Mulshi Peta to maintain the morale of the villagers and to keep them united. Public meetings with popular leaders to address them were organized. The leaders led from the front by example and were always the first to go to jail and face any atrocities in the hope that the Mawalas, their family members and volunteers would join the movement on a large scale and continue to participate and that the Satyagrahis would not fall prey to temptations and leave the movement. But the response in respect of money and manpower remained low in spite of all these efforts and precautions. The editor of the Swarajya, S.M. Paranjpe, who had himself participated in the Satyagraha, writing about the Satyagraha in 1925 has voiced the same feelings namely, that Maharashtra fell short of the leaders’ expectations regarding collection of funds and manpower for this movement.!® He has said that Senapati had to resort to Shuddha (Pure-violent) Satyagraha only because of the lack of sufficient response to the non-violent Satyagraha.'’ This observation was quite true. Senapati would not have had to consider violent means had there been a Satisfactory response to the Sama (non-violent) Satyagraha.
In those days Maharashtra was torn apart on the issue of change and no-change, a fact which not unexpectedly affected the Satyagraha movement.'® Those who were in favor of Nagpur Congress (1920) resolution of non-cooperation became known as no-changers while those who insisted on modifying the resolution came to be known as pro-changers. Some supporters of Mulshi withdrew their support owing to this dispute. The non- changers like, Shankarrao Deo, who had once undergone imprisonment on account of the agitation, later completely dissociated themselves from the movement.'? Once released from jail, activists like Deo did not wish to dedicate any time to the Mulshi struggle. The no-changers thought it more important to make efforts to acquire control over the Maharashtra Congress Committee. Building up the lobby of no-changers in Maharashtra was considered more important. Bhuskute expressed his regrets thus, “Mulshi was just a stepping stone for Shankarrao Deo to enter the provincial Congress Committee, and once there he gave himself up to its activities.” Thus, lack of wholehearted and consistent support by no-changers was also one of the reasons for the failure of the Mulshi movement. No-changers were 1n favor of continuing with the non-cooperation movement. These were the Gandhians who subscribed to the idea of Satyagraha. But if they were reluctant to support Mulshi, it is hardly surprising then that the pro-changers did not support the movement.
KELKAR’S APPROACH
N.C. Kelkar was the main leader of the pro-change group. He wielded influence over Maharashtra in those days. After the death of Lokmanya Tilak in 1920 he had stepped into the editorship of the Kesari and with that assurned also the leadership of Maharashtra. Therefore, Kelkar’s approach towards Mulshi could be directly related to the outcome of the movement. Asa result of Lokmanya Tilak’s extraordinary leadership, the Kesarn carried so much weight with the Maharashtrians that public opinion in Maharashtra was determined by the stand taken by the Kesar. Kesari’s halo that he had inherited had definitely helped him. From the very beginning he had misgivings about Gandhi's politics. He disagreed with Gandhi’s policies and did not find his methods suited to himself. Kelkar had also preferred to stay away from the politics of the masses, though Tilak, his mentor, was the first to employ this approach. After Tilak’s death, Kelkar toned down the extremism of Tilak’s politics and adopted moderate ways. In order to carry Tilak’s politics into the next Stage it was necessary to follow Gandhian way. But when Kelkar had reservations about Tilak’s methods it was out of the question that he could take to the full-fledged mass politics of Gandhi.
This moderate leader, with an aversion for the pohtics of the masses and doubts about the efficacy of Satyagraha had been dragged into the Mulshi Satyagraha movement by the prevailing conditions. Jt was the Kesari which had brought the issue of the Mawalas of Mulshi into the open. Kelkar himself was the first to suggest that the Mawalas would make use of Satyagraha in the matter. But when Satyagraha seemed inevitable, he suggested suspension of the movement for a while in favor of attempts to arrive at a compromise. This suggestion was not accepted. In his article, written after the Satyagraha movement was withdrawn, S.M. Paranjpe says that to save the Mawalas land from being acquired, Kelkar had at first supported the Satyagraha movement and signed the declaration (12 April 1921) but he changed his views later on and then advocated the policy of compensation. The Mawalas had, therefore, put their faith in his pledge when they had themselves signed the declaration. The Kesari explained that Kelkar had supported the Satyagraha only because he thought it would induce amendments in the Land Acquisition Act and help the local people to avert any damage. But S.M. Paranjpe pointed out that Kelkar had not participated in the Satyagraha even for those objectives which he himself advocated. He accuses Kelkar and others not only of not participating in the Satyagraha but of creating unfruitful diversions in the movement. Kelkar expressed views concerning the acceptance of compensation which only the Government or the Tatas could be expected to hold. Paranjpe held that this attitude damaged the movement and was one of the factors leading to the failure of the Satyagraha.?! Vinayakrao Bhuskute had been an important leader of the movement from the very beginning. He too shared Paranjpe’s views regarding Kelkar. Bhuskute says it was the Kesari which had first thought of protesting by means of a Satygraha. It stuck to this view till the first round of the Satyagraha. But it departed from its original position after an agreement was signed between the Company and the Government and the rates of compensation were declared. The Kesari confused the Mawalas by writing in favor of compensation awards. Bhuskute had not expectecl that such a policy would get support from Kelkar.?2
PRO-COMPROMISE STAND
The accusations made by Paranjpe and Bhuskute about Kelkar were not fully justified. Kelkar had never been in favor of the extreme “Jan or Jamin” (life or land) stand. When the Mawalas and their leaders like Bhuskute, Deo and Paranjpe could not be convinced to suspend the Satyagraha and make efforts towards a compromise he was left with no choice but to sign the declaration to save the lands from submergence. He probably reasoned that the Satyagraha campaign would at least speed up the process of arriving at a compromise. Secondly, Kelkar’s Standing in the politics of the time was such that no political movement could be Started in or around Pune without at least his nominal support. He was aware of this and that appears to be the reason why he signed the declaration. However, a careful reading of his editorials written during the first campaign of the Satyagraha shows that he was only reiterating his views expressed in the very first conference held at Baramati in March 1921.23 He was strongly in favor of a compromise. At the same time the withdrawal of the hydro-electric scheme at Mulshi was not the kind of compromise he was looking for, even though the scheme did mean submergence of the lands, houses and temples of the Peta. In his presidential address at the Mulshi Conference (11 June 1922), B.S. Munje had suggested that the dam be constnicted at some other site in the Sahyadri ranges, but a survey of suitable sites for hydro-electric schemes had already been made by experts. The Tata Company, too, had prepared an exhaustive plan of sites for the generation of hydro-electricity in the Bombay province. The Mulshi scheme was a part of this overall plan. It was inconceivable, therefore, that Tatas would give up that scheme. What then could be the nature of the com promise? An assurance could be extracted from the Company and the Government that alternative lands would be made available and liberal compensation would be given to peasants and other residents of the villages and the process of giving this compensation would begin without any delay. This was the kind of compromise that Kelkar expected. For this purpose he wished only to hold out the threat of a Satyagraha and keeping it in abeyance to force the Government and the Company to agree to the compromise. In his editorial in the Kesarion 25 October 1921, Kelkar had discussed the different prevailing opinions regarding the Satyagraha movement. One of the lines of thinking rejected the extreme position of “Jan or Jamin” and advocated a pragmatic view of looking for a just compromise between the Mawalas, the Government and the Company with the help of a third party. The Satyagraha could have been justified if it had been undertaken at the very beginning of the project. But the Tatas by mistake or due to lack of regard for justice had already spent lakhs of rupees. The Land Acquisition Act was also in force. Now the Company should be penalized by being made to pay for compensation, the amount of which should be fixed by an arbitrator. The Land Acquisition Act should be withdrawn and all transactions should be carried out amicably. The Act should be arnended to - prevent such incidents in the future. This school of thought was a conciliatory one. Those belonging to it wished to avoid Satyagraha as far as possible.?4 Kelkar was one of them. Hence, it is wrong to accuse him of being a turncoat or of taking on an anti-Satyagraha stand after the compensation awards were announced. A movement of the nature of a Satyagraha had absolutely no place in his political philosophy. He was consistently in favor of conciliation, from the very beginning tillthe end.
JAN OR JAMIN
Many of the leaders connected with the movement were of the opinion that the extreme position of ‘Jan or Jamin” adopted by the pro-Satyagraha group was the single significant factor for the failure of the movement. As we have just seen Kelkar was against such an extreme stand from the beginning. Senapati Bapat, analyzing the failure of the movement when he was sentenced to jail in 1925, observed that the Satyagraha was undertaken without leaving any scope for a compromise. The situation went out of hand when the conditions of a compromise, offered by the re- spondents in the cause on their own initiative were rejected by the Satyagrahis. In November 1921, after the first round of Satyagraha Lallubhai Samaldas had on behalf of the Company made a request to hold talks for a compromise. Accordingly, jJ.S. Karandikar, the President of the Satyagraha Mandal (Satyagraha Organization) made arrangements for talks with Ratan Tata and Lallubhai, the directors of the Company. But the leaders of the Satyagraha rejected this offer completely. The Company had been ready at that time to give land watered by the Nira right bank canal or to give an amount of money fixed by arbitrators. But the leaders declared that they had only one point on their agenda and that was jan or jamin. According to Kelkar these leaders of the Satyagraha ruined the Mawalas.”° Shankarrao Deo has himself admitted, in his autobiography, that this rigid stand was itself misconceived. The policy of jan or jamin was not the right approach from the point of view of the general well-being of the society. Resettlement was the real issue. If the movement had concentrated on that from the beginning, failure could have been avoided.*°
THE POLICY OF COMPENSATION
Jaykar and N.V. Gadgil, too, shared this view. Jaykar intervened twice between the Tata Company and the Satyagrahis to bring about a compromise.?’ Gadgil did not join the Satyagraha because he was in favor of compromise. He witnessed the Satyagraha campaigns as a reporter of the Bombay Chronicle. The booklet entitled “A Case for Mulshi Peta Satyagraha” distributed among the shareholders of the Company in November 1921 was written by him. He was also a member of the advisory committee of the movement (formed at the time of the Baramati Conference). He has said in his autobiography that asking for alternative land or liberal cash compensation would have been appropriate from the point of view of the good of the nation but that view was not accepted.?§
While commenting on the Mulshi Satyagraha after fifty years or so G.T. Madkholkar and Neelkanth Khadilkar inthe Tarun Bharat and Navshakti, respectively, have criticized the extremist position taken by the Satyagrahi leaders. Acccrding to Madkholkar, short- sightedness and an impractical attitude were the reasons for the failure of the movement.” Khadilkar terms the movement itself as ill-conceived. In his opinion it would have been far better to follow the path (of compromise and accepting compensation) as shown by Kelkar after the Satyagruha had run for some time. But the leaders took the stand that peasants should not take any compensation at all. This naturally led to the failure of the movement.*°
There is no doubt that if a conciliatory stand had been taken, the Satyagraha would have been successful. That is, the Satyagraha would not have lasted for so long, in the first place, if the Satyagrahis had started the movement with the limited purpose of obtaining the maximum possible compensation or alternative land. Certainly it would not have restarted in November 1921, because negotiations for a compromise could have been held at that time. The Mawalas would possibly have got the land which was watered by the Nira right bank canal. But that did not happen. The movement failed after three years of struggle because it demanded the closure of the Scheme. On the ground, both the movement and the project work went on simultaneously. And when the Mawalas started accepting compensation, the very purpose of the Satyagraha was defeated.
MORALE OF THE SATYAGRAHIS
The deteriorating morale of the Mawalas was one more reason for the failure of the Satyagraha. The leaders left the movement half way; and turned their attention to the wider movement of the Congress. Shankarrao Deo is a typical example of a leader who caused the Mawalas to lose their morale. When leaders like Bhuskute, Dastane and especially Senapati Bapat were arrested, the Mawalas were quite discouraged. While leaders and Mawalas were being arrested, not only could other Mawalas see that the moneylenders were accepting compensation all the while, but also that work on the dam was progressing unhindered.
At this time, there was nota single leader with the Mawalas who could have sustained their courage. If morale could have been maintained high enough to prevent the acceptance of com- pensation the Satyagraha could have continued retaining the support it already had. When this was not possible, working to obtain the maximum possible compensation would have been the pragmatic strategy. The policy of Satyagrahalacked conviction at this stage. After his release from jail, Senapati also realized, that the Mawalas who remained with the Satyagraha suffered the most damages. He, therefore, released the Mawalas from their pledge not to accept compensation. Other leaders of the Saltyagraha Mandal did not show the moral courage to do the same.”!
As a matter of fact, the Mawalas and the moneylenders had been accepting compensation ever since 1921. Government records show that nearly 15 to 17 per cent accepted in 192] and 80 per cent in 1922 the remaining people accepted it in 1923 or in 1929-30. It is obvious from this statistics that the Mawalas and moneylenders were accepting compensation even as the Satyagraha campaign went on, because the fight was going out of them day by day.32
The non-Brahmans had opposed the Satyagraha from the start. A Satyagrahaunder the Brahman Congress leaders for the benefit of moneylenders was not acceptable to them. This opposition helped the Government and the Tata Company indirectly. The non-Brahmans tried their best to undermine the resolve of the non-Brahman Mawala peasants participating in the movement. The moderates also took an adverse stand with respect to the movement. The leaders and newspapers of the moderates adopted a position favoring economic growth and indus- trialization. By extending full support to the Scheme which benefited the Parsee-Gujarati capitalists of Bombay, they only ensured the failure of the movement. It must be remembered here that the moderates not only opposed the leadership of the extremists leaders of the Tilak school, but were also in opposition, on grounds of both principle and strategy, to the rising leadership of the Gandhi school.33
‘SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDE
The participation of the volunteers from outside Mulshi played a significant role in the outcome of the Satyagraha. In a way, the Satyagraha movement certainly benefited from the gathering of these volunteers. Because they came from the remotest corners of the whole of Maharashtra the entire province was swept by a wave of awareness of the Satyagraha. The number of Satyagrahis going to jail increased considerably. But there was another side to it, too. This was the Mawalas’ fight. The proposed project would affect the Mawalas whose lands were to be submerged. It was perfectly understandable if outsiders joined the movement in sympathy with the Mawalas’ cause and to register protest against the imperialistic and anti-people policy of the Government or the profiteering of the Tatas. But the outsiders’ participation in the movement became questionable once the Mawalas began to leave the movement and accept compensation. The report of the Mulshi Sahayak Mandal (16 February 1923) records that 400 persons went to jail, only 96 of them being Mawalas. This means the remaining 304 persons were volunteers from outside Mulshi.
If the struggle was indeed for and of the Mawalas, the number of outsiders going to jail was disproportionately large.. Granting that their participation helped to spread the nationalist and Gandhian movement, their presence in the movement became open to criticism once the Mawalas began to withdraw from the agitation. The non-Brahmans and the moderates could make the accusation that the movement was organized to create an atmosphere of protest against the Government rather than to help the Mawalas. We see that this criticism too affected the movement adversely. In the later stages, the Kesari too took a neutral stand because Kelkar was strictly against outsiders conducting the Satyagraha.34
ANTI-DAM MOVEMENTS
Finally it must be reiterated that the Mulshi Satyagraha was a protest against the dam by the dam-affected people. The dam- affected population is always a minority as against the large population which benefits from the project. The anti-dam movements such as Mulshi basically involve tribals or farmers who lack social, political and economic resources. On the one hand they make very specific demand of stopping the construction of dam and on the other challenge the established model of economic development and also the entrenched interests. The failure to stop the construction of dam and to change the concept of development has remained the characteristic feature of all anti-cdam movements since the Mulshi. The recent failure of the Save Narmada agitation to stop the huge dam on the Narmada river being constructed in Gujarat tells us the same story. The Satyagraha path has not taken the dam-affected people to their destination. It seems that a radical revision in the theory and practice of Satyagraha has become imperative so that the marginalized sections—displaced villagers do not take for an alternative path.
NOTES
1. Raghavan Iyer (ed.), The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi, New Delhi, 1991.
2. S.N. Navare, Senapati, Mumbai, 1976, p. 93.
3. Young India, 27 April 1921. .
4. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. XX, April-August 1921, Delhi, 1966.
5. Young India, 27 April 1921.
6. Ibid., 25 April 1922.
7. Ibid., 31 August 1921.
8. Shankarrao Deo, Dev Dete Pan Karm Nete, Saswad, 1976.
9. Dattoba Dastane, Eka Mook Sevakache Samarpit Jeevan, Jalgaon, 1975,
p. 36. Here Gandhi is referring to Senapati Bapat who joined the movement in April 1921 and became the sole leader from May 1922. In his early career Bapat was involved in terrorist nationalism. However when he joined the Mulshi agitation he took vow that he would abide by the rules of Gandhian method of non-violent Satyagraha which he called Sama Satyagraha. He had own idea of Saltyagraha—the Shuddha (pure) Satyagraha—which he thought should be used when the non-violent methods have failed. The pure Satyagraha method of Bapat included destruction of the property and also the use of violence to achieve the truth. Bapat did employ this type of method with the help of five volunteers when the non-violent movement came to halt in November 1924. In a symbolic act the volunteers wounded the workers going to the site of the dam by train and Bapat fired a shot at the driver which hit his leg. He was sentenced to seven years of rigorous imprisonment and the volunteers also faced the punishment.
10. Deo, op. cit., pp. 82-3.
11. M.R. Jaykar, The Story of My Life, vol. 1, Bombay, 1958, pp. 462-3. Khilafat movement was a pan-Islamic movement (1919-20) aimed at defending rights of Turkish Sultan—Khalifa after the defeat of Ottoman Empire. Indian Muslims participated in the movement.
12. Jaykar, op. cit., p. 463.
13. N.R. Phatak, Adhunitk Bharat Sevak, Mumbai, 1967, pp. 80 and 195. See also, Sumit Sarkar, Modern India 1885-1947, Madras, 1986, p. 210.
14. Sumit Sarkar, op. cit., pp. 212-13.
15. Loksangraha, 20 February 1923.
16. Swarajya, 18 June 1925.
17. Ibid.
18. Lokmanya, 14 June 1925.
19. Swarayya, 18 June 1925.
20. V.M. Bhuskute, Mulshi Satyagraha, Pune, 1968, p. 170.
21. Swarajya, 2 August 1925.
22. Bhuskute, op. cit., p. 170.
23. Kesari, 26 April 1921.
24. Ibid., 25 October 1929.
25. Ibid., 23 June 1925.
26. Deo believed in Jan or Jamin position while he was in the movement. See Deo, op. cit., pp. 81-2.
27. Jaykar, op. cit., pp. 455-8 and 461-3.
28. N.V. Gadgil, Pathzk, vol. 1, Pune, 1964, p. 163.
29. Varun Bharat, 1 December 1974.
30. Navshaktu, 29 November 1967.
31. Kesar, 23 June 1925.
32. Conveyance of Land situated inthe Mulshi Peta Dated 10th December 1936, the Secretary of State for India in Council to the Tata Power Co. Ltd., pp. 531-75. .
33. Rajendra Vora, Mulshi Satyagraha, Pune, 1994, pp. 130-42.
34. Kesari, 23 June 1925.
REFERENCES
Bhuskute, V.M., 1968: Mulshi Satyagraha. Pune: Dastane Ramchandra Ani Company.
Dastane, Dattoba, 1975: ka Mook Sevakache Samarpit Jeevan. Jalgaon: Devkinandan Narayan.
Deo, Shankarrao, 1976: Dev Dete Pan Karm Nete. Saswad: Saswad Ashram Vishwastha Mandal.
Gadgil, N.V., 1964: Pathik, vol. 1. Pune: Venus Prakashan.
lyer, Raghavan, ed., 1991: The Essential Writings of Mahatma Gandhi. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. .
Jaykar, M.R., 1958: The Story of My Life, vol. 1. Bombay: Asia Publishing House.
Navare, S.N., 1976: Senapati. Mumbai: Mauj.
Phatak, N.R., 1967: Adhunik Bharat Sevak. Mumbai: Mau}.
Sarkar, Sumit, 1986: Modern India, 1885-1947. Madras: Macmillan.
Vora, Rajendra, 1994: Mulshi Satyagraha. Pune: Pratima Prakashan.
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