The Congress(I) defeat in Maharashtra
MAHARASHTRA has witnessed an unprecedented and, in many ways, unbelievable defeat of the Congress(I), resulting in the first-ever real non-Congress government. In ageregate terms, a negative swing of 7.2 percentage points since the 1990 election has cost the Congress 61 seats in the Assembly as well as the seat of power in Bombay. This defeat, however, is much more serious than what the figures show. Many stalwarts, faction leaders and members of the Sharad Pawar Ministry, have not been re-elected. Former Chief Ministers and aspirants for the chair have been denied even a membership of the Assembly. Several district-level leaders enjoying an impressive support base of long standing were defeated. Even in the Congress bastions, in the 72 constituencies which have sugar cooperatives, inside or outside the sugar belt, the party has lost 26. This failure calls for an explanation. It needs to be noticed, first of all, that there is an interesting relationship between the swing against the Congress and the rise in voter turnout compared to the last Assembly election (both fall between 7 and 8 percentage points). In absolute terms, the number of votes polled by the Congress has remained at the same level 11.9 million this time compared to 11.3 million in 1990. The Shiv Sena-Bharatiya Janata Party votes have gone up by 3.4 million (from 7.9 million to 11.3 million). The number of total valid. votes rose by 8.8 million. Roughly speaking, one can say that the Congress failed to add to its 1990 vote, while the Shiv Sena-BJP alliance captured well over one-third of the new voters. In this respect it is significant that Marathwada and Vidarbha, the two regions which recorded the highest rise in turnout, were also the regions where the Congress suffered the steepest decline in this election. The second significant factor which emerges from a detailed analysis of the results is that rebel candidates proved most crucial in determining the fate of of the Shiv Sena-BJP dates. Wherever Muslim the Congress. Rebel candidates a are not a new phenomenon for the Congress, but in the February 1995 elections there were nearly 200 of them. The party acknowledged this by taking dis ciplinary action against 166 of them. . On one count 40 Congress rebels managed to win (they are among the 45 independents who made it). In another 41 constituencies, the official Congress ‘candidates were defeated because of the votes secured by the rebels who did not win. It may be inferred that the Congress could have secured 81 more seats over and above the 80 it has actually won. Thus the root cause of the Congress defeat is to be found within the Congress organisation rather than outside it. Disenchanument of Muslims also contributed to the defeat of the Congress. Muslims, who constitute 9.3 per cent of the population of the State, have consistently voted for the Congress with the exception of 1977. The Muslim vote matters in about 40 constituencies of Maharashtra. An analysis of the voting pattern in these constituencies shows that Muslims had decided to teach the Congress a lesson. The demolition of the Babri Masjid, the subsequent riots, the bomb blasts and the question of identity cards had generated strong antCongress sentiment among them. The elections gave them an opportunity to express it. But this does not mean that they went in favour alliance. Muslims have voted for Muslim candi candidates were not seriously in. the fray, they preferred non-Congress and non-Hindutva alliance candidates. A total of eight Muslim candidates have won this time’ as compared to seven in the 1990 Assembly election. Of these, two each have won on the Congress and the Janata Dal ticket, three on the Samajwadi Party ticket and one on the Shiv Sena ticket. More significantly, in as many as 10 constituencies with a significant Muslim presence, the Congress candidates faced defeat because the Muslim vote swung away in what appears like a premeditated move.
If these 10 constituencies are added to the 81 where rebels caused a Congress defeat, the total number of constituencies where the Congress could have won becomes 91. The organisation of the party is in total disarray today. It has become a conglomeration of factions, and has no ideology’ or a leader to bind them together in a workable unity. The Maharashtra Congress has converted itself into a bundle of complacent feudal Maratha leaders having no will and capacity to see beyond their cooperatives, districts or clans. The infighting among the pro-Sharad Pawar and anti-Sharad Pawar factions has ultimately led to the loss of power.
Moreover, the Congress leadership coming from the rural areas has not been able to grasp the transformation that is taking place in the economy of the State. Sharad Pawar, a true representative of this change, has not succeeded in communicating the message to his fellow-Congressmen. The rural economy is now linked to the international market. The days of small-scale. agro-industries and cooperatives. are over. The reign of the market, competition, joint stock companies and multinationals has come to stay. The leaders of the cooperatives are trying to oppose the incoming privatisation In vain. . The fast growth of the urban sector has compounded the difficulties of the rural-based Congress. The rate of urbanisation is very high in Maharashtra. The proportion of the urban population in the State is nearly 39 per cent whereas the all-India average is 26 per.cent. Add to this the growing significance of the urban sector in the State’s economy. After the . unfolding of the New Economic. Policy, 1,535 industrial projects an investment of Rs. 106,708 crore are in various stages of planning, Of these,’ 152 (worth Rs. 22,000 crore) involve participation by non-resident-Indians (NRIs). Maharashtra and Gujarat account for 63 per cent of the total _NRI investment in India. In 1993-94, the manufacturing sector contributed 25.6 per cent of the total State income while the agriculture sectors contribution was 20 per cent. There are 70 urban constituencies, of which the Congress was able to capture only seven, while the Shiv Sena-BJP alliance . got 52. Bombay, the business capital of India, voted overwhelmingly for the alliance (30 out of 34 ‘ seats). The BJP, with a following among the “upper castes”, whitecollar workers, trading communities and the educated middle class, is in control of the cooperative banks, educational institutions, libraries and cultural associations in the urban areas. It has a good base among the Hindi, Sindhi, and Gujarati-speaking people. Twelve out of the.18 non-Marathi members of the new Assembly have won on the BJP ticket.
Even the Shiv Sena no more takes an anti-non-Marathi posture. Saamna, the mouthpiece of the Sena, publishes a Hindi edition in view of the growing Hindi-speaking population of Bombay. Its trade union front has been friendly with Bombay business since its inception, and at the same time has a very good following among factory workers. In this way the Shiv Sena-BJP alliance has come to acquire a dependable base in the urban areas.
The composition of the new. Government makes the point clearer. In the 16-member Cabinet, 10 are from urban constituencies, seven of these from Bombay city. What is more, they hold key portfolios such as Finance,’ Revenue .and Industry. For the first time after the formation of the State in 1960, Maharashtra has a Brahmin Chief Minister, besides two’ Ministers. In Brahmin Cabinet Maharashtra, Brahmins are basically an urban community. The caste and communal composition of the Manohar Joshi Government shows there are only two Marathas im the Cabinet as against 10 last time; the number of Ministers from Other Backward Classes has gone up to four from three last time. Marathwada This. change in the social character of the Government has not been accompanied by any significant change in ‘the ‘social composition of the. Assembly. Marathas and Kunbis have maintained their strength of 114 and 24 respectively, making the proportion of the Maratha caste cluster 47.9 per. cent nt (significantly higher than its share of about 31 per cent in the population). If the 40 reserved constituencles are taken out, the proportion -of the goes up to 55.6 per seats. Interestingly, the ShivSena, which made inroads into the rural OBCs, is emerging as an alternative available to Marathas. The number of Marathas among the Shiv Sena MLAs is 32 while it is 44 in the Congress and 21 among the independents. The newly-elected Maratha MLAs of the Shiv Sena are young and command very litle support in the cooper atives-and so on. They are mostly disgruntled persons who were not absorbed in the local power structure by the clannish. Marcthas of the Congress. The Shiv Sena also represents the vocal, section of Marathas who were not happy with the Congress decision to change the name of University to Dr. Ambedkar Marathwada University. By opposing this action, Shiv Sena chief Bal Thackeray successful mobilised the Marathas in this region. It is not surprising that the Congress rebel who opposed the renaming won the election and has joined the new Government as a Minister of State. The Maratha Maha Sangh, an organisation of Marathas, had entered into an alliance with the Shiv Sena All these factors contributed to a clear division of the Maratha vote this time. But the caste group which really caught the attention of the radicals and various political commentators was the OBCs. Our analysis suggests that there was no OBC consciousness at work in these elections. The number of OBC MLAs has remained almost the same . (between SO and 53). The share of Malis and Dhangars, the two important peasant castes among the OBCs, has declined in the new . Assembly (from 11 to four and from five to three respectively). Now, on the performance of the other parties. Attempts to form a third Maratha-Kunbi group. cent of the 248 general areas by mobilising the. Red force failed because of the short-sightedness. and pettiness of the leaders of the smaller parties of the centre and the Left. Therefore -two fronts were formed. The Progressive Democratic Front (PDF) comprised the Janata Dal, the Peasants and Workers Party, the Republican Party (Khobragade), ‘the Dalit Mukti Sena (Kawade), the Samata Party and the. Dalit Panthers led by a Maratha leader from western Maharashtra. Among these only the Janata Dal and the. Peasants and Workers Party tasted some success 11 and six seats. ‘respectively, Others drew a blank. Another front was formed under the leadership of Prakash Ambedkar. It comprised the Communist Party of India, the Communist. Party of India (Marxist), the Kamgar Aghadi, the Satyashodhak Communist Party, the Red Flag Party, the Bharatiya Republican Party and the Bahujan Maha Sangha. This entered into an agreement with the Bahujan Samaj ‘Party (BSP) and the Samajwadi Party (S.P.) of Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav. Except the CPI(M) and the S.P. which got three seats each, none of the parties could secure even a single seat. Sharad Joshi’s rightist party, which contested nearly i150 seats, secured only two. The Nag Vidarbha Andolan Samiti, which fought for a separate Vidarbha, and another insignificant outfit called the Maharashtra Vikas Party secured one seat each. In other words, the Congress will be the only significant party in the Opposition.
What course of action will the new -Government take? On the crucial economic front, it will not make any major changes because both the partners are fundamentally in agreement with the Congress policy. On the social front, the new Government is likely to pursue its anti-Muslim, militant Hindu stand while making certain cosmetic changes. Both the partners, especially the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)-dominated BJP, will be interested in an intervention ‘in the. cultural and ideological sector. The Government may also take up some populist programmes to win the ‘Lok Sabha elections’ next year. The strong anti-democratic tendency of the educated and the moderately educated . and the middle and lower middle class-. es of Maharashtra will be represented by the Sena Pramukh, who has already become the real centre of power.
Professor Rajendra Vora, Department . of Politics and Public Administration, University of Poona, was assisted by ‘Nitin Birmal in writing this article.
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Frontline (1995 ) मध्ये प्रकाशित